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This research models the impact of firm pricing decisions on different facets of the customer 
purchasing process in business-to-business (B2B) contexts and develops an integrated 
framework for inter-temporal targeted pricing to optimize long-term profitability for the 
firm.  
Pricing decisions in B2B settings are inherently different from those within the business-
to-consumer (B2C) environment, commonly studied in marketing. First, B2B pricing often 
offers considerable flexibility in implementing first degree and inter-temporal price 
discrimination, i.e., sellers in B2B contexts can easily vary prices across customers and can 
even change prices between subsequent purchases by the same customer. While this 
flexibility affords significant opportunities for the firm, it also requires great care in 
ensuring long-term profitability. Second, transactions in the B2B environment are often 
more complex than those in B2C settings. Specifically, the business customer typically 
makes several interrelated decisions (e.g., when and how much to buy, whether to ask for a 
quote and whether to accept the seller’s bid), which need to be modeled jointly.  
The proposed model considers these inter-related decisions in an integrated fashion. In 
addition, the model accounts for heterogeneity in customers’ preferences and behaviors, 
asymmetric reference price effects, and purchase dynamics, while taking into account the 





related joint customer decisions, we use hierarchical Bayesian copulas, which weave 
together different marginal distributions to form joint distributions.  To account for 
dynamics in purchase behavior and to model the possible long-term impact of experienced 
prices on the different components of the customer’s decision, we use a non-homogenous 
hidden Markov model with multivariate interrelated state-dependent behaviors. In addition, 
we rely on the behavioral pricing literature in modeling the effect of price, using asymmetric 
reference price effects.   
We calibrated the model using longitudinal transaction data from a metals retailer. The 
results reveal several substantive insights about the short- and long-term impact of the firm's 
pricing decisions on each of the inter-related components of the customer’s purchasing 
behavior. Specifically, we find positive interdependence between the quantity and purchase 
timing decisions and strong negative interdependence between the decision to request a 
quote and the decision to accept it. Capturing the long-term and asymmetric impact of 
reference prices, we find that losses not only have larger negative effects relative to gains on 
customers’ buying behavior, but customers also take longer to adapt to losses than they do 
to gains. Furthermore, the firm’s pricing decisions could have a long-term impact on its 
customers by shifting their preferences between a “vigilant” state - characterized by a 
cautious approach towards ordering and heightened price sensitivity, and a more “relaxed” 
state. These dynamics imply that the B2B seller needs to carefully consider both the short- 
and the long-term consequences of its pricing policy when setting prices for each order. 
Additionally, the proposed model exhibits superior predictive performance relative to 
several benchmark models, and in a price policy simulation results in a 52% improvement in 





performed are made when pricing in volatile economic environments. Other policy 
simulations are conducted to examine how the B2B firm should price in the recent economic 
environment with volatile commodity prices. We find when commodity prices increase, the 
firm should pass the costs to the customers, when the prices decrease, the firm should 
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Despite the major role of the business-to-business (B2B) sector in the U.S. and world economy, 
marketing modelers have paid scant attention to B2B issues. While the B2B and business-to-
consumers (B2C) markets are approximately equal in size (U.S. Department of Commerce 
2007), it is estimated that only a small fraction (approximately 3.4%) of the articles in the top 
four marketing journals deal with B2B contexts (LaPlaca and Katrichis 2009).  Among the 
different marketing decisions, the study of pricing in B2B environments is particularly under 
researched (Reid and Plank 2004).  While Kalayanaram and Winer (1995), in their review of the 
literature on pricing and reference prices, called for further research to investigate the impact of 
pricing and reference prices on industrial buyers and urged researchers to go beyond contexts 
involving frequently purchased packaged goods, in the decade that has passed since this call to 
action, little has been done to address this gap.   
Pricing decisions in B2B contexts differ inherently from those within business-to-
consumer (B2C) environments on multiple facets. First, B2B environments, which are often 
characterized by highly variable costs of goods, variable order sizes and personal selling oriented 
transactions, offer considerable flexibility in implementing first degree and inter-temporal price 
discrimination. That is, sellers in B2B situations can easily vary prices across customers and can 
even change prices between subsequent purchases of the same customer. While this flexibility 
generates significant opportunities for the firm, it also requires great care in ensuring long-term 
profitability.  
Second, transactions in B2B markets are more complex than those in B2C situations. The 
business customer typically makes several inter-related decisions (e.g., when and how much to 





integrated approach for modeling the impact of pricing on these different facets of purchasing 
behavior.  
Third, the B2B environment is often characterized by long-term relationships between 
buyers and sellers (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Pricing decisions can play a vital role in developing 
and sustaining such relationships (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995).  Accordingly, pricing models 
in the B2B context need to account for purchasing dynamics and the possible long-term effect of 
pricing decisions, and should be capable of representing the evolution of the relationships over 
time (Netzer et al. 2008).  For example, the development of trust between the buyer and the seller  
over time may shift the buyer from a state of higher price sensitivity to a state involving lower 
price sensitivity, thus creating dynamic price effects.   
Finally, decision makers (buyers and sellers) in B2B settings are often assumed to behave 
rationally (Reid and Plank 2004).  Thus, while behavioral pricing theory suggests that customers’ 
internally constructed reference prices play an important role in their purchase decisions, and that 
loss aversion should be considered in modeling reference price effects (Kalyanaram and Winer 
1995), it is not clear whether such behavioral effects are operant in the B2B domain.  
The objective of this paper is to develop an integrated framework for modeling the 
multiple impacts of pricing in B2B transactions, and for aiding firms in implementing first-
degree and inter-temporal price discrimination for long-run profitability.  Our modeling 
framework jointly considers the multiple inter-related decisions that customers make on each 
potential purchasing occasion in an integrated fashion. It accounts for heterogeneity in customer 
preferences and behaviors to facilitate targeting, incorporates asymmetric reference price effects 
to understand the role of behavioral effects, and models purchase dynamics and the possibly 
long-term effect of pricing to facilitate optimal dynamic targeting. 
In our modeling framework, we incorporate the marginal effects of reference prices on 
each one of the customer decisions and then weave together these interrelated decisions using a 
hierarchical Bayesian copula approach (Nelsen 2006; Pitt et al. 2006; Trivedi and Zimmer 2007) 





allow for the construction of joint distributions from univariate marginal distributions. 
Specifically, we use the Frank copula (Frank 1979; Travedi and Zimmer 2007), which 
accommodates both positive and negative dependence, to combine the four customer decisions: 
purchase timing, purchase amount, quote request, and bid acceptance distributions in a flexible 
fashion, while simultaneously accounting for appropriate conditionality and selectivity. The 
Bayesian control function framework allows us to fully account for potential endogeneity in 
prices, and to avoid biased estimates on customer’s price sensitivities. We then represent 
dynamics in purchasing behavior using a multivariate non-homogeneous hidden Markov model 
(Montoya et al. 2009; Netzer et al. 2008; Schweidel et al 2009). Thus, prices are allowed to 
affect in the short run the four inter-related behaviors, the actual impact being conditional on the 
latent behavioral state of the customer. In addition, prices can also influence the transition 
between latent states and thereby have a long-term impact.  
Thus, our model is unique in its ability to represent the short- and long-term impact of 
pricing on multiple facets of customer purchasing behavior and provides the firm greater fine-
tuning capability in eking out more profits from each customer an over time.  Methodologically, 
to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers to apply copulas in marketing (see 
Danaher and Smith, forthcoming for an exception), and the first paper to integrate copulas, 
control functions with a hidden Markov model (HMM) in a comprehensive Bayesian framework. 
We calibrate the model using longitudinal transaction data from a retailer of metals 
(aluminum and steel) selling to industrial customers.  The results of our empirical application 
demonstrate that the asymmetric reference price has varying short- and long-term effects on each 
component of the industrial customer’s decisions.  For example, a price increase has the 
strongest immediate negative impact on the customer’s decisions on when to buy and whether to 
accept or reject the seller’s bid.  The strongest long-term impact of a price increase, on the other 
hand, is on the customer’s decision whether to request a price quote (as opposed to order directly 
without asking for a quote first).  The decisions with respect to when to purchase, whether to ask 





how much to buy exhibits gain seeking.  Furthermore, we identify two latent buying behavior 
states: a vigilant state characterized by enhanced price sensitivity and a cautious approach 
towards ordering, and a relaxed state characterized by more direct orders and lower price 
sensitivity. We also find that past prices can have a long-term effect on the customer buying 
behavior, and price changes (particularly price increases) can take the customer long time to 
adapt to.  These dynamics imply that the B2B seller needs to carefully consider both the short- 
and the long-term consequences of the pricing policy when setting prices for each order.   
The application of the model for individual targeted pricing is illustrated using a “what-
if” analysis of alternative pricing policies. We show that if the company adopts our dynamic 
targeted pricing policy, it would drastically increase the profitability. Additionally, using a 
validation sample, we demonstrate that the proposed model improves the ability to predict all of 
the dimensions of the buying process, relative to several benchmark models.  
In summary, our research pushes forward the pricing literature in several directions. On 
the methodological front, it provides a state-of-the-art and unique framework for dynamically 
modeling multiple facets of customer purchasing in B2B settings.  On the substantive front, it 
provides an individually targeted dynamic pricing framework for B2B settings, which yields 
insights about how the short- and long-term effects of behavioral demand parameters such as loss 
aversion, reference price, and latent buying behavior states shape customer demands in what is 
traditionally considered to be “rational” purchasing activity. Furthermore, our findings provide 
strong evidence for value-based pricing policies even in a traditional B2B industry characterized 
by cost-plus pricing practices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the challenges and 
opportunities in investigating pricing decisions in B2B settings.  Section 3 presents the proposed 
modeling approach for capturing dynamic pricing effects on the industrial buyer’s demand.  
Section 4 illustrates the proposed model using B2B transaction data from an industrial metals 







2. Dynamic Individually Targeted Pricing in B2B Settings  
Our research lies at the intersection of two literatures. These include the relatively thin body of 
work involving choice modeling in B2B settings and the abundant literature on pricing which has 
focused, primarily, on the B2C context.  In this section, we briefly review these twin literatures 
and highlight the challenges involved in adapting the received wisdom on price targeting, 
dynamic pricing and behavioral modeling to the B2B context. We also focus on the opportunities 
that exist in this area and showcase how we contribute to the above literatures.  
 
2.1 Pricing in Business-to-Business Markets 
Although pricing is one of the most important aspects of B2B marketing, it is paradoxically also 
one of the most neglected areas of study (Reid and Plank 2004).  The majority of the research on 
B2B pricing is based on conceptual models and surveys (Johnston and Lewin 1996).  The scant 
attention given to pricing models in B2B research could stem from the view advanced by some 
researchers that price is of little importance relative to other attributes in B2B settings, and that 
business customers are less sensitive to price when compared to consumers in B2C markets 
(Avila et al 1993; Lehmann and O’Shaughnessy 1974 and  1982; Wilson 1994). However, others 
have argued that prices do in fact play a major role in many B2B situations (e.g., Hinterhuber 
2004). In this paper, we demonstrate that because of long-term buyer-seller relationships, 
business customers can transition over time between states of low and high price sensitivity, thus 
possibly reconciling these two opposing views.   
Decision makers (buyers and sellers) in B2B settings are often assumed to behave 
rationally (Reid and Plank 2004).  Accordingly, the B2B pricing literature sparingly draws upon 
the voluminous behavioral pricing research on reference pricing and loss aversion (see Briech et 
al. 1997 and Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995 for a review). One of our objectives in this research is 






2.2 Dynamic and Individually Targeted Pricing 
Customization is an emerging topic in academic research (Gupta et al. 2006) and in the world of 
practice (Peppers and Rogers 1994).  The empirical literature on targeting has primarily focused 
on non-price marketing actions such as catalog mailing (Bitran and Mondschein 1996; Gönül 
and Shi 1998; Gönül and Ter Hofsted 2006; Simester et al. 2006), coupons (Gönül and 
Srinivasan 1996; Rossi et al. 1996), e-mail marketing campaigns (Ansari and Mela 2003), and 
pharmaceutical detailing and sampling (Dong et al. 2009; Montoya et al. 2009), as it is natural to 
think of such marketing actions as customizable and targetable at the individual level. In 
contrast, empirical research on individually targeted pricing has been relatively sparse, possibly 
due to the logistical, ethical, and legal issues concerning price discrimination in traditional (B2C) 
settings.   
Several studies, however, have investigated targeted pricing at a more aggregate level 
(i.e., at the level of customer segments).  Taking an analytical, competitive strategy, approach, 
Chen (1997), Klemperer (1995), and Shaffer and Zhang (1995 and 2000) derived qualitative 
conclusions about which segments of customers to target to enhance profitability.  In the 
empirical domain, Zhang and Krishnamurthi (2004) showed how promotions can be targeted to 
segments of online customers and Lewis (2005) proposed targeting of newspaper subscription 
rates to different segments of customers.  
In addition to targeting, dynamics has been incorporated in pricing models in myriad 
ways.  Reference price models based on the customer’s history of purchases (e.g., Hardie et al. 
1993) capture some degree of dynamics in price sensitivity and can generate implications for the 
firm’s dynamic pricing policy (Greenleaf 1995; Kopalle et al. 1996).  In addition, changing 
customer preferences may also generate dynamics in price sensitivity.  For example, Lewis 
(2005) modeled dynamics in the form of customers’ forward looking expectations about future 
prices.  In a related vein, several studies have investigated the relationship between state-
dependence and pricing decisions (Berry and Pakes 2000; Chan and Seetharaman 2004; Pakes 





Our research differs from the above studies in several aspects. First, because our context 
involves longitudinal transaction from a B2B retailer, our objective is to customize prices both at 
the individual level, as well as temporally over repeated transactions for the same customer. 
Second, most pricing models investigate the effect of the firm’s pricing on brand choices or a 
single purchase decision. For example, Lewis (2005) investigated the effect of pricing on 
customers’ decisions to renew newspaper subscriptions.  On the other hand, we investigate the 
impact of the firm’s pricing policy on a complex sequence of inter-related customer decisions 
that are typical of B2B environments. Finally, we allow for dynamic pricing and for the enduring 
impact of reference price effect using a state-of-the-art multivariate non-homogenous HMM.  
 
2.3 Reference Prices in Customer Buying Behavior 
The notion that consumers use reference prices in assessing the attractiveness of offers is well 
established within marketing (Hardie et al. 1993; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Kalwani et. al. 
1990; Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; Lattin and Bucklin 1989; Winer 1986).  However, reference 
price effects have not been incorporated in the empirical research on targeted pricing.  Ignoring 
the effect of reference prices could potentially bias the proposed targeting policy.  Furthermore, 
despite the popularity of reference prices, they have been used almost exclusively in B2C 
contexts (often using scanner panel data). In this research we explore the role of reference prices 
in B2B settings.  B2B purchasing is often considered rational because of the relative expertise 
and sophistication of the B2B buyer, and due to the typically large size of transactions. 
Accordingly, the existence of behavioral pricing effects in this context is not obvious.  
The literature distinguishes between “internal” and “external” reference prices.  External 
reference prices stem from forces exogenous to customers such as the manufacturer’s suggested 
retail price (MSRP), regular prices (Burton et al. 1993; Urbany et al. 1988), or the prices of other 
products in the consideration set (Hardie et al. 1993), and are generally assumed to be observable 
and common to all customers. On the other hand, internal reference prices are assumed to be 





previous purchase occasions (Hardie et al. 1993; Kalwani et al. 1990; Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; 
Lattin and Bucklin 1989; Winer 1986).  Operationally, internal reference prices are often 
calculated as the price observed in the previous purchase occasion, or a weighted average of past 
observed price.  Briesch et al. (1997) compared several reference price mechanisms, including 
several forms of internal and external reference prices, and concluded that internal reference 
prices best fit the data.  Given the relatively long buyer-seller relationships in the B2B 
environment, and because past transactions are often formally recorded by buyers, one may 
argue that internal reference prices could play an important role in B2B purchasing as well. 
Reference prices are an application of the more general notion of reference point in 
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1979). According to prospect theory, gains and losses 
relative to the reference point have asymmetric effects, such that losses loom larger than gains. 
Thus, an observed price that is lower than the reference price is seen as a “gain”, whereas, a 
higher observed price is perceived as a “loss”. Several studies have demonstrated such 
asymmetric reference price effects in the context of brand choice (Chang et al. 1999; Hardie et 
al. 1993; Kalwani et al. 1990; Putler 1992), purchase timing (Bell and Bucklin 1999), and 
purchase quantity (Krishnamurthi et al 1992).  In our modeling framework, we incorporate 
internal reference price effects based on the buyer’s past experienced prices and allow for 
asymmetric gain and loss effects.  Furthermore, we allow reference prices to affect the 
customer’s transitions between several buying behavior states, capturing the, possibly, long-term 
effect of reference prices.  Thus, our research furthers the reference price literature along several 
dimensions: 1) we examine reference price effects in a B2B setting, which traditionally assumed 
normative customers, 2) the complexity of the purchasing decision in B2B settings offers an 
opportunity to investigate the effect of reference prices not only on the decision to purchase but 
also their simultaneous effect on the timing of the purchase, the quantity purchased and the 
nature of the ordering process, 3) we account for reference price effects in a context which 





possibly long-term effect of reference prices.  In the next section we formulate our modeling 
framework aimed at achieving these objectives.   
 
3. Modeling Framework 
The model described in this section is a customer-level model of buying behavior comprised of 
four interrelated customer decisions: 1) when to buy, 2) how much to buy, 3) whether to ask for a 
price quote (hence allowing the seller to bid for business) or order directly without asking for a 
quote first, and 4) whether to accept the quote if a bid is made by the seller.  We consider a set of 
customers, each of whom is involved in repeated interactions with the seller.  The seller observes 
the buying behavior and pricing history for each customer as well as the marketing environment 
at every time period.   
We model a sequence of purchase events for each customer.  A purchase event is 
described by either a direct order from the customer which always result in a purchase, or a 
request for a quote followed by the acceptance or rejection of the quote.  Each purchase event is 
also described by the timing of the event and a quantity that is desired.  On receiving a quote 
request or a direct order, the seller decides the unit price to charge for the customer.   
To allow for customer dynamics over repeated purchase events we allow the customer to 
transition between different latent buying behavior states that differentially impact the customer 
decisions.  For example, a state with a high propensity to request quotes rather than order directly 
when coupled with high price sensitivity may characterize a customer who is in an evaluative 
mode and is testing the seller.  Over time, the customer may develop trust in the relationship with 
the seller and transition to a more relaxed or trusting state characterized by a higher propensity to 
order directly, without a quote request, and a diminished sensitivity to prices.  The seller’s past 
pricing decisions may affect the customer’s transition between successive states.  For example, 
pricing that is favorable to the customer may facilitate a transition from an evaluative state to a 





To model such behavior, we define a multivariate non-homogeneous hidden Markov 
model.  In the HMM, the joint probability of a sequence of interrelated decisions up to purchase 
event j for customer i, { }, ...,=i1 i1 ij ijY y Y = y  is a function of three main components: (1) the 
initial hidden states membership probabilities ( iπ ), (2) a matrix of transition probabilities among 
the buying-behavior states ( →ij-1 jΩ ), and (3) a multivariate likelihood of the interrelated customer 
decisions conditional on the customer’s buying-behavior state. We describe our formulation of 
each of these components next. 
 
3.1 Initial State Distribution - Let s denote a buying-behavior state ( 1,2,...,s S= ).  Let isπ be 
the probability that customer i is initially in state s at time 1, where 0 1isπ≤ ≤  and 1 1S iss π= =∑ .  
We use S-1 logit-transformed parameters to represent the vector containing the initial state 
probabilities.  
 
3.2 The Markov Chain Transition Matrix - We model the transitions between states as a 
Markov process.  Each element of the transition matrix ( , →i j-1 jΩ ) can be defined as 
1( | )ijss ij ijP S s S sω ′ −′= = = ,the conditional probability that customer i moves from state s at 
purchase event j-1 to state s′ at purchase event j, and where '0 1ijssω≤ ≤  , 's s∀ , and '' 1ijsss ω =∑ .  
As the transition probabilities are influenced by the seller’s pricing decisions at the previous 
purchase event j-1, we define: 















,     (1) 
where ij-1x  is a vector of covariates (e.g., price and reference price) affecting the transition 
between states and isγ  is a state- and customer-specific vector of response parameters. 
 
3.3 The State Dependent Multivariate Interrelated Decisions - Conditional on being in state s 
at purchase event j, the customer decides when to order, how much to order, whether to order 
directly or submit a request for price quote, and whether to accept the quote (firm’s bid) if a 





the customer’s latent state. To allow these decisions to also be conditionally interrelated, we 
model dependence using a copula (Danaher and Smith 2009; Trivedi and Zimmer 2007).  The 
use of copula allows us to model each decision flexibly using appropriate marginal distributions. 
At the same time, copulas capture interdependence to yield a rich multivariate specification. 
We can write the vector of observed customer behaviors for customer is at purchase event 
j as: ( , , , )ij ij ij ijq t b w=ijy , where ijq is the quantity requested or ordered, ijt is the time, in weeks, 
since the last quote or order (i.e., the inter-purchase-event time), and ijb  and ijw  are the binary 
quote request and quote acceptance decisions, respectively.   
Given that customer i is in a latent state ijS s=  on purchase event j, we can factor the 
state-conditional discrete-continuous joint likelihood, |ij sL , for the four interrelated behaviors as:
1 
| ( , , , ) ( , )Pr ( , | , )ij s s ij ij ij ij s ij ij s ij ij ij ijL f q t b w f q t b w q t= =    (2)   
In the above, we assume that the joint decisions of when to order and how much to order 
arise primarily from the customer's need for the product. As these decisions occur prior to the 
decision to request a quote or order directly, they impact the latter set of decisions.  For example, 
it is possible that customers are more likely to request a price quote on larger orders.  Naturally, 
the decision to accept or reject a quote occurs only on occasions when the customer decides to 
request a quote rather than order directly from the seller ( 1ijb = ). Let bijδ be a quote request 
indicator, which equals 1, if purchase event j for customer i is a quote request and 0, if it is a 
direct order.  Accordingly, we specify the joint probability of ijb  and ijw  using a selectivity 
approach: 
          
1Pr ( , | , ) Pr ( 0 | , ) Pr ( | 1, , )Pr ( 1 | , )
bb ijij
s ij ij ij ij s ij ij ij s ij ij ij ij s ij ij ijb w q t b q t w b q t b q t
δδ− ⎡ ⎤= = = =⎣ ⎦  .  (3) 
In modeling the time between purchase events, ijt , the last observation for each customer, 
*
ijt , is censored because of the fixed time horizon of the dataset. Let ( )*ijS t  be the survival 
function for the censored observation, and let cijδ be a censoring indicator, which equals 1 if 
                                                 
1 To avoid clutter, we describe first the model in the general distribution form, omitting the customer-level subscript 





observation j for customer i is censored, and 0, otherwise.  Accordingly, accounting for 





( , , , )
( ) ( , ) Pr ( 0 | , ) Pr ( | 1, , ) Pr ( 1| , )
c
ijbc b ijij ij
ij s s ij ij ij ij
s ij s ij ij s ij ij ij s ij ij ij ij s ij ij ij
L f q t b w
S t f q t b q t w b q t b q t
δδδ δ −−
= =
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= = = =⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.   (4) 
Next, we define the distributional assumptions of each of the four customer decisions and 
the copula approach to interrelate these distributions.   
3.3.1 Modeling Quantity and Time between Events. We use a bivariate copula to model the 
joint density of quantity and time between events, ( , )ij ijf q t .  The copula weaves together the 
univariate marginal distributions into a joint distribution.  That is, the joint CDF of ijq  and ijt  is  
        ( , ) ( ( ), ( ))s ij ij sq ij st ijF q t C F q F t= ,    (5) 
where, C() is a copula function and Fsq and Fst are the c.d.f’s for the quantity and inter-purchase-
event time variables, respectively ..  The joint density can then be written as: 
                ( , ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ), ( )]s ij ij sq ij st ij qt sq ij st ijf q t f q f t H F q F t= ,  (6) 
where, ( )sq ijf q  and ( )st ijf t  are the univaraite marginal densities, and [.,.]qtH  is the double 
derivative of the copula function C() with respect to the two marginal c.d.f’s. We condition on 
the state throughout to highlight that the distributions are state dependent. 
Many different distributions are possible candidates for modeling the inter-purchase-
event time and quantity variables. In the current application, we assume that the times between 
purchase events follow a log-logistic distribution (Lancaster 1990, pp 44). The p.d.f of the log-























,      (7)  
and the c.d.f is written as  


























where, 0sα > , is a shape parameter, tsiβ  is vector of coefficients for customer-level, purchase-
event specific covariates such as prices and reference prices, and tijξ  represents an unobserved 
shock associated with the inter-purchase-event time. The random shock tijξ  is assumed ot be 
correlated with the unobserved shock of the pricing equation to account for endogeneity (see 
section @@). We use the log-logistic distribution as it is flexible in accommodating both 
monotonic and non-monotonic hazard functions. For 1sα ≤  the hazard decreases with ijt ; for 
1sα >  the hazard function first increases and then decreases with ijt , reaching a maximum at 




ξ αα += − ij six βt .  

















 ,                (9) 
where qsiβ is a vector of coefficients for a set of customer-level and purchase-event specific 
covariates that affect the mean quantity, qijξ  is an unobserved random shock that is correlated 
with the unobserved shock in the pricing equation discussed subsequently,σ  is the scale 
parameter, and φ represents the p.d.f of a standard normal distribution. The corresponding c.d.f is 
given by 
      
log( ) '








− −= Φ ij qsix β ,     (10) 
where, Φ represents the c.d.f of the standard normal distribution.  
Given these marginals, we use the Frank copula (Frank 1979; Trivedi and Zimmer 2007) 
to model the interdependence between quantity and inter-purchase-event times.  There are many 
families of copulas which differ in the nature of the dependence they represent. We chose the 
Frank copula as it covers the entire domain between the Frechet-Hoeffding bounds and thus 
allows for both positive and negative interdependence. The Frank copula for quantity and inter-
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⎛ ⎞− −= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
,   (11) 
where the parameter qtθ captures the interdependence between the quantity and inter-purchase-
event time decisions. For 0qtθ > the interdependence between quantity and inter-purchase-event 
time is positive, and for 0qtθ <  the interdependence is negative. The resulting joint density of the 
two variables is derived in Appendix A.  
3.3.2 Modeling Customer Quote Request and Acceptance Decisions.  Let customer’s i’s binary 
quote request decision on purchase event j be given by ijb that is governed by an underlying latent 
utility *ijb  such that: 
*1, if 0  (indirect),








Similarly, conditional on a price quote let customer’s i’s binary decision to accept or reject the 
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The joint distribution of ijb and ijw can be specified as the product of the marginal distribution for 
the quote request (i.e., ijb ) and  the conditional distribution of quote acceptance or rejection given 
a quote. Thus, for quote orders, we can distinguish between those that were accepted (the seller 
“wins” the bid; 1ijw = ) and those that were rejected (the seller “loses” the bid; 0ijw = ). For 
accepted orders ( 1ijw = ) we have (see Appendix A for the full derivation) 
       
* * * *
Pr ( 1| 1, , ) Pr ( 1| , )
Pr ( 1, 1| , ) 1 Pr ( 0) Pr ( 0) Pr ( 0, 0)
s ij ij ij ij s ij ij ij
s ij ij ij ij s ij s ij s ij ij
w b t q b t q
w b t q b w b w
= = × = =
= = = − < − < + < <     
,  (12)  
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= = = < − < <     
.   (13) 
As for the quantity and inter-purchase-event time copula, we model the joint probability 
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,  (14) 
where the parameter bwθ captures the interdependence between the quote request behavior and 
quote acceptance decisions.  For the marginal distributions, we assume that each of the latent 
variables, *ijb  and 
*
ijw are distributed logistic. Thus,  
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< = + ij wsix β
.       (15) 
The vector of parameters bsiβ  and wsiβ  relate the quote request and quote acceptance latent 
utilities, respectively, to a set of covariates such as price, reference price, time since last order 
and inter-purchase-event time. bijξ  and wijξ  are the unobserved shocks associated with the quote 
request and quote acceptance decision, respectively. These are assumed to be correlated with the 
unobserved shock of the pricing equation discussed subsequently. 
Inserting equations (6)-(15) into equation (4) we get the full likelihood of observing the 
four interrelated customer decisions conditional on the customers state.  To complete the HMM 
specification, we vectorize the state-specific full conditional multivariate behaviors 
|1 |2 |[ , ,..., ]ij ij ij SL L L′ =ijm .  To ensure identification of the states, we restrict the probability of 
quote request to be non-decreasing in the buying behavior states.  We impose the restriction 
01 02 0...b i b i b Siβ β β≤ ≤ ≤    by setting 0 01 02 exp( )sb si b i b s isβ β β ′′== +∑ ;  s=2,…,S. As both the 
intercepts and the response parameters are state-specific, we impose this restriction at the mean 
of the vector of covariates, i.e., by mean-entering ijx .    
 
3.4 The Control Function Approach to Price Endogeneity 
It is possible that the firm pricing decisions are based on unobserved factors that also impact the 





based on private information it has that is not observed to the researcher. In such case, price will 
be correlated with the unobserved components (the ' sξ ) of the four distributions. Ignoring this 
endogeneity can lead to misleading inferences about the price sensitivities of consumers (Winer 
and Villas Boas 1999). We use a Bayesian control function approach to account for price 
endogeneity (Gupta and Park 2009; Petrin and Train 2010).  In the control function approach, we 
express price as a function of observed instrument variable ijz  that is correlated with price, but is 
uncorrelated with the unobserved factors impacting four decisions. Formally, we have 
1 2 ,ij ij ijp zγ γ μ= + +          (16) 
where ijμ are unobserved factors influencing the pricing decision. We assume that ijμ is 
distributed jointly bivariate normal with each of , { , , , }lij l t q b wξ ∈ in Equations (7), (8), (9), (10), 
and (15) to account for endogeneity. For each one of the four decisions the bivariate normal 
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      (17) 
where 2pσ  is the variance of ijμ , 2lσ is the variance for the random shocks lijξ , and ,p lρ  is the  
covariance terms capturing the correlation between ijμ  and lijξ . We use wholesale price as an 
instrument for price. The wholesale price is observed by the retailer but not to customers. In 
particular, in our applications, discussions with the management indicate that the salesperson 
observes the wholesale price on their computer screen when determining the price. Wholesale 
price has been commonly used as instrument for price (cite). After incorporating the price 
endogeneity, the likelihood in Equation (2) can be amended to obtain the state-specific likelihood 
for all endogenous variables.  
| ( , , , , ) ( , | ) Pr ( , | , , ) ( )ij s s ij ij ij ij ij s ij ij ij s ij ij ij ij ij ijL f q t b w p f q t p b w q t p f p= = .   (18) 
3.5 The HMM Likelihood Function 
Given the Markovian structure of the model, the likelihood of observing a set of joint customer 





The likelihood of observing the customer’s decisions over J purchase events can be succinctly 
written as (McDonald and Zucchini 1997): 
   , ,( ,..., )iJL P → → ′= =i1 i1 iJ iJ i i1 i 1 2 i2 i J-1 T iJY = y Y = y πM Ω M ...Ω M 1 ,      (19) 
where iπ is the initial state distribution described in section 3.1, , →i j j+1Ω is the transition matrix 
described in section 3.2, ijM  is a S×S diagonal matrix with the elements |ij sL from Equation (18) 
on the diagonal, and ′1  is a S×1 vector of ones.  To avoid underflow, we scale the likelihood 
function in Equation (19) using the approach suggested by MacDonald and Zucchini (1997, p. 
79).   
 
3.6 Recovering the State Membership Distribution   
We use the filtering approach (Hamilton 1989), to determine the customers' membership 
probability in any state at any given purchase event. The filtering probability that customer i is in 
state s at purchase event j conditioned on the customer’s history of choices is given by: 
 , , |( | , ,.., ) /ij ij s ijP S s L L→ →= =i1 i2 ij i i1 i 1 2 i2 i j-1 t•sY Y Y π M Ω M ...Ω ,          (20) 
where, Qi,j-1→j.s is the sth column of the transition matrix Qi,j-1→j , and, Lij is the likelihood of the 
observed sequence of joint decisions up to purchase event j from Equation (19). 
 
 
4. Empirical Application 
In this section, we apply our model to two years of transactional data from a B2B retailer of 
metals.  We aim to investigate the short- and long-term impact of the retailer’s pricing decisions 
on the buying decisions of customers. We begin by describing the characteristics of the data. We 
then estimate the multi-decision HMM model and assess the impact and duration of the pricing 
effects. Finally, we use the estimated parameters to conduct “what-if” simulations to investigate 
how various managerial metrics are impacted by alternative pricing policies.  
 
4.1 Data 
The dataset comes from an east coast local B2B metals retailer that specializes in supplying 





geographical trading area. The dataset consists of customer-level transactions over a 21 month 
period from January 2007 to September 2008. As the purchasing process in B2B settings can be 
complex, it is noteworthy to first describe the typical flow of a purchase opportunity. After a 
need for a certain quantity arises at a certain point in time, the customer places an order with the 
retailer. An order can originate either with a request for a price quote (usually via the phone or 
via fax) or by a direct order without asking for a price quote (hereafter “direct order”). For 
example, a typical direct order may be received by fax in the morning saying: “Send me four 
aluminum sheets A inch by B inch and thickness of C inch by tomorrow afternoon”.  Direct 
orders are generally fulfilled immediately and the customer is charged a price determined by the 
seller. Alternatively, if the customer requests a quote (hereafter “indirect order”) the firm bids for 
the customer’s business, and can only “win” the business if the customer accepts the quoted 
price.2 Our dataset is unique as it includes not only completed transactions but also lost 
transactions involving bids that were lost, thus allowing us a better grasp of customer price 
sensitivity. The company has a very large number of SKUs that are defined based on the shape, 
thickness and customizable size of the aluminum. Furthermore, the wholesale cost of aluminum 
changes on a daily basis following the London Metal Exchange. These two facts preclude the 
maintenance of a price list, therefore, as typical in this industry, the company determines the 
price to charge or bid on a case by case basis.3  
We use the term “purchase event” to define an indirect or a direct order.  For every 
purchase event we observe: the date that the customer initiates the order; the quantity requested; 
whether the customer ordered directly or requested a quote; if a quote, whether the customer 
purchased or not; and the price the firm quoted and/or charged.  To account for the variation in 
order quantities, and because of the large number of SKUs, we normalize prices to price per 
pound.  
                                                 
2 Discussions with the management and sales personnel in the company that provided the data revealed that 
negotiations, beyond the request for the price quote and the firm initial bid, are not common.  
3 As is typical of most customer relationship management (CRM) datasets in B2B settings, our dataset does not 
include information about the competition. However, unfulfilled indirect orders provide an indirect signal for a 





Our sample contains 1,859 customers for whom we observe at least 7 purchase events 
(bids or orders) in the data period.  Tables 1 and 2 contain the summary statistics of the data. The 
data contains 33,925 purchase events (bids and/or orders) totaling 16 million lbs (approximately 
7,250 metric tons) of aluminum. Of these, 53% (18,038 purchase events) were direct orders in 
which no price quote was requested. The relatively large proportion of direct orders is consistent 
with Shipley and Jobber (2001) who argue that in B2B settings, customer needs are often urgent 
and account for a small proportion of the buyer’s total expenses, leading to relatively low price 
sensitivity. Of the indirect orders, 47% (7,501 orders) were won by the company.  
Table 1: Overall Statistics 
   
Number of customers 1,859 
Overall number of observations (purchase events) 33,925 
Proportion of direct purchases 0.53 
Proportion of quotes that are accepted 0.47 
 
On average, a customer in our sample engages in 23.6 purchase events during the span of 
21 months. An average purchase event involves 457 lbs of aluminum with an average price of 
3.24 $/lb. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Per Customer 








Total number of purchase events 23.6 20.8 8.0 16.0 52.0 
Proportion of direct orders 55.6 24.6 21.4 57.1 87.5 
Order amount for direct orders (US$) 861 1,636 100 402 1,932 
Order amount for quote requests (US$) 1,724 3,445 165 667 3,770 
Purchase event amount (US$) 1,236 1,471 292 808 2,458 
Quantity (lbs) 457 553 92 288 968 
Inter-purchase-event time (weeks) 6.41 4.31 1.80 5.23 12.45 
Unit price (US$) 3.24 0.76 2.44 3.08 4.29 
Table 2 show that 1) direct orders tend to be smaller, possibly suggesting that buyers are 





their metal needs and transactions with the firm; 3) heterogeneity in the average price paid is 
relatively low 4) customers exhibit different degrees of caution when it comes to ordering 
behavior, as some are more prone to order directly without asking for a price quote than others, 
suggesting that customers may vary in their attitudes and latent relationships with the firm; 5) the 
fact that about half of the orders are direct, which result in a sale regardless of the price charged, 
suggests that the firm might be able to charge “any” price on such orders.  As we demonstrate 
later, our dynamic model allows us to estimate the possibly negative long-term consequences of 
such “over-charging” pricing behavior.  
Applying the modeling framework described in Section 3 to our dataset, we wish to 
answer the following questions:  1) How does pricing affect each dimension of the buying 
process? 2) What are the short- and long-term effects of observed price? 3) How can the firm use 
pricing to change the behaviors of its customers? 4) What are the implications of the firm’s 
pricing policy for long-term profitability?  
 
4.2 Variables Description 
In this section we describe the variables that potentially impact the different components of the 
customer decision.  
4.2.1 Asymmetric Reference Price Effects  
First, we specify how we account for reference price effects.  We assume that customers 
pay closer attention to the prices of larger orders relative to smaller ones. We therefore define the 
reference price as a quantity weighted average of the customer’s past observed prices (in $/lb). 
The reference price is constructed internally for each customer and is updated at every time 
period to include the most recently observed price.  The reference price for customer i, at 
purchase event j, can be written as:4  
                                                 
4 We compared the reference price in Equation (21) against several alternative reference prices such as simple 
average of past purchases, the price in the last purchase event and an external reference price from the LME spot 
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 We define asymmetric reference price effects (Putler 1992) via “gain” and “loss” 
variables computed from the difference between the current price and the reference price. 
Specifically, we define: 
1. ijgain : The difference between the price per pound in the current purchase event and the 
customer’s internally constructed reference price as calculated in Equation (21), for 
customer i at purchase event j, when the current price is lower than the reference price (i.e., 
the current price is perceived as gain).  
_ _  ,   If  _ _ ,
0                                                 ,    Otherwise. 
ij ij ij ij
ij




Similarly we define: 
2. ijloss : The difference between the price per pound in the current purchase event and the 
customer’s internally constructed reference price for customer i at purchase event j, when 
the current price is higher than the reference price (i.e., the current price is perceived as 
loss).  
_ _  ,   If  _ _ ,
0                                                 ,    Otherwise. 
ij ij ij ij
ij





4.2.2 Additional Variables 
1. jlme : To control for fluctuations and trends in aluminum prices, we overlay the transactions 
dataset with the daily aluminum spot prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME).  This 





2. _ jlme volatility :  The volatility of the aluminum spot price on the LME, calculated as the 
standard deviation of the LME daily returns over the seven trading days prior to purchase 
event j.  
3. ijquantity : The quantity (pounds of aluminum) that the customer i requested on the purchase 
event j.  
4. ijt : The time in weeks between customer i’s purchase event j-1, and purchase event j. 
  
4.3 Model Specification 
We now describe how the above mentioned variables are incorporated in the general model 
described in section 3.  
4.3.1 The State Dependent Decisions 
1. Quantity Decision: We let the lognormal distribution of the quantity ordered be a function of 
past internal reference price effects and the external price level and volatility in metal prices. 
We expect that price loss [gain] in the previous purchase event will lead to lower [higher] 
quantity ordered in the current purchase event. Accordingly, the vector ijx  in Equation (9) 
includes the covariates: 1ijgain − , 1ijloss − , jlme , and _ jlme volatility . 
2. Purchase-event Timing Decision: We let the log-logistic distribution of inter-purchase-event 
time be a function of the previous quantity ordered and past internal reference price effects. 
We expect that price loss [gain] in the previous purchase event would lead to longer 
[shorter] inter-purchase-event time, and because of the role of inventory, the larger the 
quantity ordered on the previous purchase-event, the longer the inter-purchase-event time 
will be.  Accordingly, the vector ijx  in Equation (7) includes the covariates: 1ijgain − , 1ijloss − , 
and 1ijquantity − . 
3. Quote Request Decision: We assume that the probability of requesting a quote (rather than 
ordering directly), is conditioned on the time since the last purchase event ( ijt ) and the 
quantity ordered ( ijquantity ). We also allow the market conditions to affect the level of 
caution that a customer exercises in ordering. We expect that customers would avoid 





the last purchase event, or when the market conditions are volatile. When the LME metal 
price is high, however, we expect customers to be less cautious in his ordering behavior 
because, firstly, a high commodity price can indicate a benign economic environment, and 
secondly, a high LME price might be presented to customers as a high external reference 
price that will make the seller’s current price more attractive. Furthermore, the decision to 
request a quote also depends on the internal reference price effects that are experienced 
directly on the previous purchase event, and as we will describe later, also indirectly via the 
customer’s latent state. Thus, the vector ijx  in Equation (15) includes the covariates: ijt , 
ijquantity , 1ijgain − , 1ijloss − , jlme , and _ jlme volatility  
4.  Quote Acceptance Decision: Once a quote has been requested the customer’s probability of 
accepting the quote may depend on the price that is bid, the quantity ordered, and the time 
elapsed since the last purchase event. Furthermore, we test for interaction effect between the 
quantity ordered and the reference price effects.  We predict that that likelihood of accepting 
a bid will be higher when the quantity ordered is small, purchases are frequent, and the 
customer experiences either a gain (or an absence of a loss) in reference price. We also 
expect the gain and loss effects to be magnified for larger orders.  Furthermore, the decision 
might be marginally affected by the market condition. Accordingly, the vector ijx  in 
Equation (15) includes the covariates: ijt , ijquantity , ijgain , ijloss , ij ijgain quantity× , 
ij ijloss quantity× ,  jlme , and _ jlme volatility . 
 The above set of four decisions characterizes customer behavior given the customer’s 
latent state. Thus, a jointly constructed set of equations for the four decisions are defined for each 
state of the HMM following Equation (2). We model the interdependency between the quantity 
ordered and the inter-purchase-event time decisions via the Frank copula with dependency 
parameter qtθ  (see in Equation (6)).  Similarly, as bid acceptance can only take place when a 
quote is requested, bid acceptance behavior and quote request behaviors are modeled jointly 
using a copula framework for selectivity. These binary decisions follow the standard logit 
specifications in equation (15), and are jointly modeled via a Frank copula with parameter bwθ  





 To capture the dynamics in buying behavior we specify a two-state HMM. To ensure 
identification of the states, we define the intercepts in the quote request equation (Equation (15)) 
to be increasing in state’s cardinality, such that (at the mean of the covariates) the likelihood of 
requesting a quote (rather than ordering directly) is higher in State 2 relative to State 1. 
Accordingly, all covariates are mean-centered in the model. Our two-state HMM specification is 
consistent with a “relaxed” state characterized by a trustful attitude towards the seller, and a 
more “vigilant” state, in which the customer is more cautious about ordering from the seller.5   
 
4.3.2 The Non-Homogenous Transition Matrix 
 We include the asymmetric reference price effects, namely 1ijgain −  and 1ijloss − , in the 
transition probabilities specified in Equation (1). This specification suggests that the “joy of 
gain” and the “pain of loss”, experienced on the previous purchase event, can affect the 
customer’s evaluation (or re-evaluation) of the relationship with the firm, and trigger a transition 
to a different buying behavior state. Such a specification allows us to capture the possibly long-
term effect of reference prices. Accordingly, the vector 'ijx  in Equation (1) includes the 
covariates: 1ijgain − , and 1ijloss − . 
 
4.3.3 Price-Generating Mechanism Specification 
 We have data on the seller’s wholesale cost, that is, the cost that the seller pays to the 
mills for a particular wholesale lot of metal. Conversations with the management team reveal 
that each customer’s order is retrieved from a wholesale lot, and that the salesperson would focus 
on the wholesale cost when quoting the price to the customer. Thus, we include the wholesale 
cost as ijz  in the price-generating equation in Equation (16).  
 
4.3.4 Heterogeneity Specification 
                                                 





 To distinguish dynamics from cross-customer heterogeneity (Heckman 1981), we specify 
the model parameters that govern the HMM dynamics and those that are related to reference 
price effects to be customer-specific. Specifically, we allow the intercepts of the four decisions 
equations and the coefficients of the reference price related variables (i.e. ijgain , 1ijgain − , ijloss , 
1ijloss − , ij ijquantity gain× , ij ijquantity loss× , jlme ,  _ jlme volatility .) to vary randomly across 
customers. Additionally, all the parameters that influence the initial state membership and the 
customer dynamics in the transition matrix are assumed to be random across customers. For 
parsimony, all other parameters in the model are assumed to be constant across customers (see 
column 3 in Table 4 for a full list of the random- and fixed-effect parameters).6 
   
4.4 Model Estimation 
In this section we briefly discuss the estimation procedure. We use a hierarchical Bayesian 
approach for inference and estimate the parameters using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods. Given that many of the full conditional distributions in our model do not have a closed 
form, we use a combination of random-walk Metropolis-Hasting steps and Gibbs sampling steps 
to draw parameter values. We follow Netzer et al (2008) and use the HMM likelihood function 
in Equation (19) directly in formulating our MCMC methods. The inherent complexity of the 
HMM often leads to significant autocorrelation between successive draws of the MCMC chain. 
We therefore use the adaptive Metropolis procedure in Atchadé (2006), which significantly 
improves mixing and convergence. See Appendix for a detailed description of the MCMC 
estimation procedure, along with the prior and posterior distributions. 
 We use the first 18 months of data to estimate the model, and the last three months for 
validation purposes. We ran the MCMC methods for a million iterations. The first 700,000 
iterations were used as a “burn-in” period, and the remaining 300,000 iterations were used for 
parameter inference.   
                                                 
6 For parsimony reasons, we do not let the Frank copula correlation parameter ( qtθ  and wbθ ) and the scale 






4.5 Results and Marketing Implications 
In this section, we first describe the benchmark models we used to assess the relative model fit 
and predictions of our proposed model, and the parameter estimates.  We then use the estimated 
parameters as input into a set of simulation to disentangle the short- and long-term effects of the 
pricing decisions on the four decision variables for the customer.  We also derive implication for 
customer lifetime value and long-term profitability.    
 
4.5.1. Benchmark Models 
We compare the fit and predictive ability of our proposed two-state non-homogenous 
HMM model in which the multivariate outcomes are correlated via copulas, with that of four 
benchmark models.  The benchmark models vary with respect to the degree of heterogeneity, the 
degree of dynamics (i.e. via HMM specification to capture latent behavior dynamics, and via the 
reference price specification to capture dependence on past prices), the degree in which price 
endogeneity is accounted for, and the interdependence between the components of the 
customer’s buying process that they accommodate. We use the first 18 months in our dataset to 
calibrate the model and the last three months for validation.  As for our proposed model, we 
assume that in all the benchmark models, quantities follow a lognormal distribution, inter-
purchase-event times follow a log-logistic distribution, and the quote request and bid acceptance 
decisions both follow logistic distributions.  For all models, we use a Bayesian approach for 
inference. 
Benchmark Model 1 (no heterogeneity).  This model is identical to the proposed model 
in its structure except that all its parameters are considered to be invariant across customers. A 
comparison of this model with the proposed model allows us to assess the importance of 
capturing heterogeneity in the context of our empirical application.  
Benchmark Model 2 (independent decisions, no HMM).  There are two sources for 





structure creates dependence among the components.  Second, conditioned on the state, we allow 
interdependence among the components using copulas.  Thus, to create a benchmark model that 
assumes independent decisions, we estimate a single state heterogeneous model in which the 
quantity, inter-purchase-event time, quote request and bid acceptance distributions are all 
estimated independently.  This benchmark model allows us to examine the value of joint decisions 
modeling and of capturing relationship dynamics.  
Benchmark model 3 (no dynamics).  This model has a single state (i.e., no HMM) and 
uses actual prices instead of reference prices to remove dependence on past prices. This allows 
us to assess the value of capturing dynamics.  
Benchmark model 4 (not counting for price endogeneity). This model is identical to the 
proposed model in its structure except for the Bayesian control function component. This will 
allow us to first assess the value of accounting for price endogeneity, and secondly, examine the 
extent of the bias of sensitivity if price endogeneity is not properly accounted for. 
 
 
4.5.2. Model Fit and Predictive Ability 
 We use log marginal density (LMD) and the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) to 
assess model fit.  Both measures are calculated from the output of the Metropolis Hastings 
sampler.    In addition, we use the validation log-likelihood to assess overall predictive ability. 
Apart from these overall measures of model performance, we also compute component-specific 
measures. Specifically, we calculate the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the mean absolute 
deviation (MAD) between the predicted and observed values of the timing, quantity, quote 
request, and bid acceptance decisions and the hit-rates for the binary quote request and 
conditional bid acceptance decisions in both the calibration and validation samples.   
Table 3 presents the fit and predictive ability measures for the five models.  The results 
suggest that the proposed model dominates the benchmark models on the overall measures and 





periods. The relatively poor fit and poor predictive ability of the no-heterogeneity model 
suggests that the degree of customer heterogeneity in our data is substantial.  Similarly, by 
modeling purchasing decisions jointly and by incorporating dynamics via HMM and via the 
reference price specification we improve the representation and prediction of buying behavior. 
Furthermore, accounting for price endogeneity only marginally improves the model fit and 
prediction, which is not surprising as this business is traditionally based on a “cost-plus” pricing 
practice, and an regression of price on wholesale cost yields a R-squared of 0.84.   We now 
discuss the parameter estimates of the proposed model.   
 
 
* bold numbers represent the best fit/predictive ability from among the five models. 
 
 
Table 3: Model Selection and Predictive Validity 
  Proposed model Benchmark 1 Benchmark 2 Benchmark 3 Benchmark 4 
  Heterogeneity   Heterogeneity Heterogeneity Interdependence 
  Interdependence Interdependence     Heterogeneity 
  
Dynamics (HMM + 
Reference Price) 
Dynamics (HMM + 
Reference Price) 
Dynamics (Reference 
Price Only)   
Dynamics (HMM + 
Reference Price) 
  Control Function Control Function Control Function Control Function   
LMD -62,531 -90,223 -68,959 -72,173 -62,956 
DIC 129,996 180,899 141,478 148,218 130,675 
Complexity pD 4,779 75 3,432 3,253 4,763 























Rate  Quote request 0.75 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.75 0.65 
Bid acceptance 0.72 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.60 0.72 0.59 
RMSE Quantity 0.95 1.03 1.73 1.74 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.08 0.95 1.03 
Inter-purchase time 16.22 20.03 25.32 28.65 21.74 23.18 21.18 22.28 16.25 20.07 
Quote request 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.91 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.68 0.53 0.59 
Bid acceptance 0.55 0.67 0.77 1.01 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.55 0.67 
MAD Quantity 0.42 0.42 0.72 0.70 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.42 
Inter-purchase time 12.15 14.85 18.49 18.85 14.98 16.00 14.88 15.67 12.17 14.88 
Quote request 0.31 0.37 0.45 0.55 0.32 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.31 0.37 







4.5.3. The HMM Parameter Estimates  
Tables 4 and 5, contain the posterior means, standard deviations, and 95% posterior 
intervals for the parameters of the proposed model. Table 4 reports the state-specific parameters 
for each component of the buying process, whereas, Table 5 presents the HMM transition matrix 
and initial state distribution parameters, the dependence parameters for the two copulas, and the 
other parameters for the distributions of the decision variables.  
Interpreting the HMM States.  We focus on Table 4 to characterize the two states of the 
HMM.  As all covariates are mean-centered the intercept of each equation captures the average 
tendency to behave in a particular manner.  Hence, comparing the parameters for the quote 
request and bid acceptance decisions across the two states, we see that purchase events in State 2 
have a higher chance of involving indirect orders and are associated with a lower probability of 
bid acceptance compared to events in State 1. This suggests that State 2 represents a more 
cautious behavior towards ordering.  Further supporting this characterization is the fact that, 
relative to events when the customer is in State 1, events when the customers is in State 2 exhibit 
a higher sensitivity to reference price effects, stronger loss aversion in the inter-purchase-event 
time and bid acceptance decisions, and stronger gain seeking in the quantity decision.  Customers 
who are in State 2 at a given event also tend to be more responsive to the general economic 
environment (e.g. the level and the volatility in the LME), and pay closer attention to the 
characteristics of the order itself (quantity and inter-purchase-event time) in making their 
decisions.  We therefore call State 2 the “vigilant” state.  
 In contrast, customers in State 1 tend to order directly without asking for a price quote, 
are more likely to accept the seller’s bid and are generally less price sensitive than customers in 
State 2.  Thus, these customers are more relaxed in their relationship with the seller.  
Accordingly, we label State 1 as the “relaxed” state. Furthermore, customers in the relaxed state, 





in the bid acceptance decision. That is, for customers in the relaxed state the positive impact of 
gains is stronger than the negative effect of losses, suggesting that customers when in the relaxed 
state are focus more on gains than on losses.  This finding is consistent with regulatory-focus 
theory (Higgins 1997).  Customers in the vigilant state are more “prevention focused,” focusing 
on avoiding losses, and engage in a more vigilant and scrutinizing relationship with the firm. On 
the other hand, customers in the relaxed state are more “promotion-focused”, concentrate more 
on gains and price savings, and adopt a more favorable buying relationship with the seller. 
Trust has been suggested as an important facet in B2B buyer-seller relationships (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994).  Trust may serve as an underlying mechanism for the relaxed and vigilant states 
found in our empirical application.  Specifically, one may argue that customers in the relaxed 
state tend to exhibit buying patterns that are consistent with a more trustful attitude towards the 
seller relative to customers in the vigilant state.  
Reference Price Effects. The results show that B2B customers respond to both internal 
and external reference prices. Internally, price gains would make the current price more 
attractive and would hence lead to more favorable ordering behaviors, and price losses would 
conversely lead to more cautious behaviors. Externally, the results suggest that a high level of 
metal price on the LME could be interpreted as a high reference point, making the seller’s 
current price more attractive and thus leading to more favorable ordering behaviors. A high 
volatility of the LME captures uncertainty in the current economic environment, resulting in a 
more cautious approach to ordering. Once again, both internal and external reference price 
effects are stronger for customers currently in the vigilant state. 
Customer Dynamics.  According to the HMM, customers can transition over time 
between the two states, thus exhibiting dynamic behavior.  The parameter estimates in Table 5 
and their transition matrix representation in Table 6, depict these dynamics.  As can be seen in 
the middle matrix in Table 6, the states are relatively sticky.  The vigilant state is particularly 
sticky.  Assuming the customer is priced at its reference price, the likelihood that a customer in 





pricing policy to affect customer transitions between the two states.  The transition matrix 
parameter estimates in Table 5, and the left matrix in Table 6, show that a price “gain” in the 
previous purchase event increases the likelihood of a shift from the vigilant to the relaxed state 
by 2% and increases the likelihood of the customer remaining in the relaxed state by 3%.  This 
suggests that when customers perceive that they are treated well, they may transition to or remain 
in a state of more favorable relationship with the firm.  On the other hand, the right matrix in 
Table 6 shows that a price “loss” in the previous purchase event increases the likelihood that the 
customer will transition to the vigilant state by 7% and increases the likelihood of remaining in 
the vigilant state by 3.5%, which in turn, translates to further increased sensitivity to losses.  As 
shown in Tables 5 and 6, the average loss aversion in the effect of reference prices on the 
transition between the states ranges from 1.5 to 2.5. That is, the increase in likelihood of moving 
to or staying in a vigilant state due to a price loss is one and a half to two times the 
corresponding decrease in the likelihood of moving to or staying in a vigilant state because of an 





































Dev. 2.50% 97.50% 
Quantity              
State1 Intercept RE 1.823*** 0.039 -1.897 -1.751 
Gain(t-1) RE 0.004 0.021 -0.037 0.043 
Loss(t-1) RE -0.035 0.013 -0.061 -0.010 
LME(t) RE 0.029 0.129 -0.220 0.268 
LME_Volatility(t) RE -0.782 0.486 -1.720 0.122 
State2 Intercept RE -1.523 0.033 -1.587 -1.461 
Gain(t-1) RE 0.133 0.019 0.096 0.169 
Loss(t-1) RE -0.096 0.014 -0.123 -0.070 
LME(t) RE 2.813 0.539 1.774 3.815 
LME_Volatility(t-1) RE -3.350 1.054 -5.383 -1.390 
Inter-purchase-event time             
State1 Intercept RE 0.977 0.029 0.919 1.035 
Quantity(t-1) FE -0.009 0.029 -0.067 0.048 
Gain(t-1) RE -0.062 0.014 -0.091 -0.034 
Loss(t-1) RE 0.046 0.014 0.019 0.074 
       
State2 Intercept RE 0.854 0.031 0.793 0.915 
Quantity(t-1) FE 0.031 0.021 -0.010 0.072 
Gain(t-1) RE -0.016 0.016 -0.047 0.016 







Quote request vs. direct order 
behavior (1= quote request)             
State1 Intercept RE -1.125 0.034 -1.190 -1.062 
Quantity(t) FE 0.418 0.097 0.230 0.599 
Interpurchase time(t) FE 0.030 0.004 0.023 0.036 
Gain(t-1) RE -0.081 0.026 -0.132 -0.033 
Loss(t-1) RE 0.096 0.024 0.050 0.140 
LME(t) RE -0.981 0.878 -2.674 0.652 
LME_Volatility(t) RE 1.180 1.056 -0.858 3.144 
State2 Intercept FE 1.037 0.080 0.881 1.186 
Quantity(t) FE 2.090 0.575 0.981 3.160 
Interpurchase time(t) FE 0.004 0.007 -0.009 0.017 
Gain(t-1) RE -0.312 0.015 -0.340 -0.285 
Loss(t-1) RE 0.768 0.017 0.735 0.799 
LME(t) RE -1.880 0.589 -3.017 -0.784 
LME_Volatility(t) RE 3.349 1.293 0.854 5.753 
Bid acceptance vs. rejection 
behavior (1= accept)             
State1 Intercept RE 0.214 0.015 0.186 0.242 
Quantity(t) FE -0.220 0.032 -0.281 -0.162 
Interpurchase time(t) FE 0.002 0.017 -0.031 0.033 
Gain(t) RE 0.211 0.015 0.183 0.239 
Loss(t) RE -0.180 0.016 -0.212 -0.150 
Quantity(t) x Gain(t) RE 0.087 0.018 0.051 0.121 
Quantity(t) x Loss(t) RE -0.047 0.016 -0.079 -0.017 
LME(t) RE 0.212 0.500 -0.752 1.141 
LME_Volatility(t) RE -0.362 1.056 -2.399 1.602 
State2 Intercept RE 0.096 0.049 0.002 0.187 
Quantity(t) FE -0.530 0.046 -0.618 -0.444 
Interpurchase time(t) FE -0.032 0.008 -0.046 -0.017 
Gain(t) RE 0.133 0.015 0.104 0.161 
Loss(t) RE -0.211 0.020 -0.250 -0.173 
Quantity(t) x Gain(t) RE 0.285 0.015 0.256 0.312 
Quantity(t) x Loss(t) RE -1.518 0.018 -1.554 -1.484 
LME(t) RE 0.747 0.517 -0.251 1.708 
LME_Volatility(t) RE -1.294 1.056 -3.331 0.670 
              
Price equation (price_lb)             
Intercept FE 3.540 0.070 3.404 3.671 
  Std dev FE 1.104 0.254 0.613 1.577 
*Posterior means and standard deviations are calculated across retained MCMC iterations 
** RE represent random-effect parameter and FE represent fixed-effect (common) parameter  






Table 5: HMM and Distributional Parameter Estimates 
  Parameter 
Aggregation 
Level** Mean Std Dev. 2.50% 97.50% 
Transition matrix             
State1 Intercept RE 2.078 0.026 2.027 2.127 
Gain(t-1) RE 0.052 0.018 0.017 0.086 
Loss(t-1) RE -0.105 0.018 -0.140 -0.072 
State2 intercept,   RE 2.514 0.043 2.431 2.594 
Gain(t-1) RE -0.505 0.018 -0.539 -0.471 
  Loss(t-1) RE 0.712 0.019 0.675 0.748 
Initial membership             
  Pai(t) RE 0.697 0.030 0.639 0.752 
Distributional Parameters             
Std dev. for the quantity model, log scale FE 0.126 0.052 0.027 0.222 
State 1 Shape parameter for interpurchase time, log 
scale FE 0.116 0.019 0.079 0.152 
State 2 Shape parameter for interpurchase time, log 
scale FE 0.079 0.012 0.055 0.102 
Frank copula parameter for interpurchase and quantity FE 0.606 0.178 0.264 0.937 
Frank copula parameter for quote request and bid 
acceptance FE -10.023 0.563 -11.110 -8.975 
 
Table 6: Posterior Mean of Transition Matrix Across Customers 














(t) 0.895 0.105  0.864 0.136  0.795 0.205 
Vigilant 
(t) 0.096 0.904  0.078 0.922  0.043 0.957 
 
Interdependent Decisions. The parameters of the Frank Copula in Table 5 indicate 
significant and substantial positive correlation between quantity and inter-purchase-event time, 
and negative correlation between quote request and bid acceptance. The fact that these 
correlations are significant in magnitude is consistent with the improvements in fit and prediction 
of our model relative to a model that does not capture interdependence among these components 





bid acceptance rates indicates selectivity (Heckman 1981) and indicates that factors that increase 
the likelihood of quote requests also result in lower bid acceptance rates, a kind of a “double 
jeopardy” for the firm. The positive correlation between the inter-purchase-event times and 
quantity decisions can be partly explained by the presence of inventories.  Finally, the shape 
parameters for the inter-purchase-event time log-logistic distribution in Table 5, suggest that the 
baseline hazard for a purchase first increases and then decreases with time.  
Investigating Price Endogeneity. Table 7 lists the estimated price parameters under the 
proposed full model vs. the benchmark model 4, to assess the extent of price endogeneity and its 
impact on the parameters. The bottom of Table 7 shows the correlation of each one of the four 
decisions, with regard to price, inferred from the terms in the control function to correct for 
endogeneity7. The results show that with respect to the unobserved characteristics in the price 
generating mechanism, quantity and bid acceptance behavior exhibit mild positive correlations, 
whereas inter-purchase-event time and quote request behavior exhibit mild negative correlations. 
For example, an unobserved factor that would raise the price would also tend to raise the 
quantity ordered, shorten the inter-purchase-event time, lower the probability of a quote request, 
and increase the probability of a bid acceptance. These correlations structure might imply that 1) 
despite the predominant cost-plus pricing practice, the seller does occasionally target price-
insensitive[sensitive] customers by charging them higher[lower] prices, and that 2) the seller 
charges customers higher prices during an economic expansion, but the same economic boom 
would create more demand, resulting in a seemingly favorable purchasing behaviors. Hence, not 
properly accounting for price endogeneity would overestimate the effects of price gains, and 
underestimate the effects of price losses, which is what we observe in Table 7. Model 
comparison between the proposed model with the model uncorrected for endogeneity results in a 
better fit. 
 
                                                 
7 i.e. residuals and error components of the control function. For parsimony of composition, these terms are left out 






Table 7: Price Parameters - Bayesian Control Function Approach 





Dev. Uncorrected Std Dev. 
Quantity            
Relaxed Gain(t-1) 0.004 0.021 0.007 0.016 
Loss(t-1) -0.035 0.013 -0.028 0.011 
Vigilant Gain(t-1) 0.133 0.019 0.150 0.013 
  Loss(t-1) -0.096 0.014 -0.072 0.010 
Inter-purchase-event time           
Relaxed Gain(t-1) -0.062 0.014 -0.079 0.013 
Loss(t-1) 0.046 0.014 0.047 0.013 
Vigilant Gain(t-1) -0.016 0.016 -0.025 0.014 
Loss(t-1) 0.037 0.010 0.032 0.008 
Quote request vs. direct order 
behavior (1= quote request)           
Relaxed Gain(t-1) -0.081 0.026 -0.122 0.025 
Loss(t-1) 0.096 0.024 0.118 0.019 
Vigilant Gain(t-1) -0.312 0.015 -0.390 0.018 
Loss(t-1) 0.768 0.017 0.689 0.018 
Bid acceptance vs. rejection behavior 
(1= accept)           
Relaxed Gain(t) 0.211 0.015 0.253 0.014 
Loss(t) -0.180 0.016 -0.182 0.017 
Vigilant Gain(t) 0.133 0.015 0.145 0.017 
  Loss(t) -0.211 0.020 -0.224 0.020 
Inferred Correlation Structure w/ Price         
Quantity Relaxed -0.011 0.012 
Vigilant -0.021 0.013 
Inter-purchase-event time Relaxed 0.017 0.016 
Vigilant 0.025 0.016 
Quote request Relaxed 0.134 0.072 
Vigilant 0.211 0.065 
Bid acceptance Relaxed -0.108 0.059 
  Vigilant -0.144 0.061     







4.5.4. Disentangling the Effects of Pricing  
 
Isolating the impact of pricing is difficult in our model because of the complex feedback 
structures among the four customer decisions. These decisions are interrelated via explicit 
conditionality and via the copula approach. Furthermore, the use of a HMM, adds additional 
complexity in the interpretation of parameters as price can have both a short-term impact 
conditional on a state and a long-term impact via the transition matrix.  In addition, the 
decomposition of the reference price effects into gains and losses results in an asymmetric 
impact of prices, both in the short and long run.  Thus, the interpretation of the price parameters 
in Tables 4 and 5 is not immediately obvious.  To analyze the overall impact of pricing on each 
decision component, and to compute the short- and long-term price elasticities, we performed a 
series of “what-if” simulations. 
We computed the price elasticities for each of the four decision components, as well as 
for the HMM state memberships.  Elasticities for price increases are computed numerically using 
the formula , ( / ) /( / )y pe y y p p
+
+ += Δ Δ , where y corresponds to the average level for each 
decision variable,  p corresponds to the average unit price, p+Δ corresponds to increase in unit 
price, and y+Δ corresponds to the change in the level of the decisions in the presence of price 
increase.  Similarly, elasticities for price decreases are calculated using the formula 
, ( / ) /( / )y pe y y p p
−
− −= Δ Δ , where p−Δ corresponds to decrease in unit price, and  
y−Δ corresponds to the change in the level of the decisions in the presence of price decrease.  To 
compute the changes in each of the above decision levels ( y+Δ  and y−Δ ), we use the parameter 
estimates from the HMM to simulate the effect of increasing or decreasing the unit price by a 
one-time shock of 10% across all customers.  We first compute the base levels for each decision 
when there is no price shock ( 0y ) by simulating the next 20 purchase-event periods at the current 
price.  Next, we compute the outcomes for each decision during the next 20 purchase-event 





0y y y+ +Δ = − , and 0y y y− −Δ = − .  To compute the short-term elasticities, we consider the effect 
of price hike and price drop in the first purchase-event period only; whereas, the long-term 
elasticities are computed using the effects in the remaining 19 periods.  The simulated short- and 
long-term elasticities for each of the four components of the buying process and the vigilant state 
membership probability are reported in Table 7.  Similarly, Figures 1 and 2 depict the 
asymmetric percentage increase and decreases in each decision component over the simulated 20 
periods following a single period 10% price increase or decrease.  
 
Table 8: Price Elasticities of the Decision Components and the Vigilant State Membership 
Price Increase Price Decrease 
Short-term Long-term Total Short-term Long-term Total
Quantity -0.43 -2.73 -3.21 1.39 3.05 4.53 
Inter-purchase-event Time 1.22 2.34 3.57 -0.71 -0.62 -1.35 
Quote Request 0.73 4.91 5.72 -0.53 -1.59 -2.16 
Bid Acceptance -1.19 -3.42 -4.65 0.38 0.97 1.37 
Vigilant State Membership 0.62 5.47 6.18 -0.31 -1.38 -1.72 
 
 
Figure 1: Duration of the Asymmetric Price effects on Quote Request, Bid Acceptance, 









Figure 2: Duration of the Asymmetric Price Effects on Vigilant State Membership 
                  
 
 
Several insights can be derived from Table 8 and Figures 1 and 2.  First, for all four 
decisions and for the vigilant state membership, the magnitudes of the long-term elasticities are 
generally much larger than those for the short-term elasticities.  The average short-term quantity 
elasticities are consistent with those of Jedidi et al. (1999), and fall within the range of the price 
elasticities found by Tellis (1988) in a comprehensive meta-analysis of price elasticities. On 





factors that are directly related to customers’ attitudes and relationships with the seller (i.e., quote 
request and vigilant state membership) exhibit stronger long-term elasticities relative to other 
factors.  Third, consistent with loss aversion, we find that the detrimental effects caused by price 
increases (loss) are stronger than the positive effects caused by price decreases (gain) for all 
decisions but quantity. The quantity decision exhibits gain seeking.  Fourth, Figures 1 and 2 
further depict that the negative effects of a price hike (loss) persist longer, and take a longer time 
for customers to adapt to, than the positive effects of price drop (gain).  We find support for this 
result in the hedonic adaption literature, which states that individuals’ adaptation to improvements 
is faster than their adaptation to deteriorations (Frederick and Lowenstein 1999; Strahilevitz and 
Lowenstein 1998).  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the long-
term effects of asymmetric reference price effects, and demonstrate that effect of price losses are 
not only stronger in magnitude than the effect of price gains, but also last longer.   
Overall, these results suggest that 1) in the context of B2B, studies that consider only the 
short-term effects of pricing can significantly and substantially underestimate the overall impact 
of pricing, and 2) studies that do not separately examine the, possibly asymmetric, price effects 
caused by gains and losses can miss important insights into how customers behave, both in short 
and long run.  From a managerial perspective, firms need to be very wary of increasing prices 
and hence causing losses for the customer.  Such a pricing policy can not only have an 
immediate negative impact, but also the damage the relationship with the customer in the long 
run, and recovery may be slow.  Next, we demonstrate how price effects on the different 
components of the decision can be linked together to allow for an assessment of the overall 
impact of pricing on firm’s profitability through customer lifetime value. 
 
4.5.5 Heterogeneity across Customers 
Our modeling framework incorporates full heterogeneity across customers in the dynamics and 
reference price effect parameters.  For example, a set of transition matrices, as depicted in Table 





with the complete distribution of elasticities across customers for each of the average price 
elasticities calculated previously.  Figure 3 below depicts the heterogeneity in the short- and 
















                        
 
The price elasticities exhibit high degree of heterogeneity.  This result is consistent with the 
importance of heterogeneity for model fit and prediction reported in Table 3.  Accounting for the 
unobserved heterogeneity is an important component of the B2B individually targeted pricing 
strategy.  
In the next section, we discuss how to utilize the parameters estimates and the insights on 
customers’ behaviors from our proposed non-homogeneous HMM, to dynamically and 






5. Price Policy Simulation Procedure 
The separate and varied influences of price on the four customer decisions can be integrated 
using the metric of Long-term Customer Value (LCV) (Gupta and Lehmann 2002) which 
captures the overall long-term impact of pricing. The LCV for customer i is the sum of the 
discounted stream of future profits. Specifically, customer value over the next iJ  purchase 
















⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦= +∑  (22) 
where, bijδ  is a binary indicator that equals 1 when a quote is requested on event j for customer i, 
and is zero for a direct order, wijδ is another binary indicator that equals 1 when the bid is 
accepted and is zero otherwise,  represents the discount rate, and ijτ is the cumulative time until 
the jth purchase event. The seller's objective is to design a targeted dynamic pricing policy for 
each customer to maximize the LCV. 
We conduct the optimization over a 9 month horizon. We therefore split the data into a 
calibration sample covering the duration from January to December 2007 and a holdout period 
ranging from January 2008 to September 2008.8 We then use the parameter estimates from the 
calibration dataset and conduct the price optimization over the holdout period of 9 months. The 
optimization is done for a sample of 300 customers who experienced between 6 and 16 purchase 
events over the calibration period.9 An average customer has an average of ten purchase events 
in the 9-months planning horizon. 
We discretize the continuous pricing decision on any purchase event to a set of five 
customer-specific price points that form the quintiles of the range of prices that the customer 
experienced in the calibration period10. We then use a combination of forward simulation and 
complete enumeration over all feasible price paths to obtain the set of optimal prices over the 
                                                 
8 For the purpose of price policy simulation, we re-estimate the proposed full model on the first 12 months of data, 
and perform simulation on the subsequent 9 months. The estimates do not differ substantially from those using 18 
months of data, reported in Table 4. 
9 We use this criterion to choose those customers whose purchase frequencies are representative of the company’s 
customer base. 
10 We choose to stay within each customer’s historical range of experienced prices, to avoid a drastic change in the 





purchase events of the customer in the 9-months optimization horizon. The optimization process 
is initialized for each customer by setting the state membership probabilities and the reference 
price to their values at the end of the calibration period. The forward simulation proceeds by 
generating a sequence of purchase events, characterized by a new set of quantity, inter-event 
time, quote request decisions and the associated reference price and latent state-membership 
probabilities. At each simulated purchase event, profits are computed by weighing the HMM 
latent state-specific profits by the state membership probabilities. For each customer we 
simulated 200 random sequences of purchase events associated with each path such that the 
cumulative inter-purchase event time does not exceed 9 months. We then calculate the LCV over 
the 9-months horizon by computing for each price path the average net present profits, assuming 
a discount rate of 12% (a weekly discount rate r of 0.22%) over the Monte Carlo draws.11 This 
yields an optimal dynamic price policy for each customer.  Full details of the price simulation 
process are available in Appendix B. 
 
6. Price Policy Simulation Results 
Following the simulation procedure outlined in Section 5, we generate for each customer nine 
months of purchase events12, and find the price path that maximizes the LCV. We assume a 
weekly discount rate r of 0.22%, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 12%. The cost 
for the seller is mildly associated with the current level of the aluminum market price (LME), 
and we set the “cost per pound” to be 1.34+0.21*LME, which is similar to the average unit cost 
of $1.60 per pound observed in the dataset. We compare the performance of our proposed 
individual dynamic pricing policy to the performances of six competing policies: (1) an 
individual static pricing policy, (2) a segment dynamic policy, (3) a segment static policy, 4) an 
aggregate static policy, 5) a myopic individual dynamic policy, and finally, 6) the seller’s current 
pricing policy. These competing policies will help us to assess the impact of properly accounting 
                                                 
11 We tested the improvement in precision that can be gained from increasing the number of draws. We find 
diminishing marginal gains in precision with number of draws. We choose 200 draws as a good promise between 
precision and computational time, as it offers 8% improvement in profits over 100 draws, but only underperforms 
300 draws by 1%. 
12 We chose a time horizon of nine months because that is the duration of the current pricing policy in the validation 





for individual targeting, dynamics, and a long-term perspective. Under the individual policies, 
different unit prices are charged to each customer, fully utilizing each customer’s individual 
price parameters. The segment policies provide a single optimal price for those customers that 
are in the vigilant state, and a single optimal price for those that are in the relaxed state. The 
aggregate policy charges only one optimal price for all customers. With regard to dynamics, the 
dynamic policies update the prices charged to each customer at each purchase occasion, whereas 
the static policies will charge the same price to each customer (or each segment) throughout the 
simulation horizon. Specifically, the static policies identifies each customer’s buying state at the 
beginning of the simulation and treat these initial state memberships as fixed indefinitely, hence 
neglecting the possibility that customers’ buying states can change at each purchase occasion 
throughout the planning horizon. In other words, static policies might initially identify a 
particular customer as a valuable customer, and will repetitively price the same way on each 
purchase occasion, failing to acknowledge that this customer might have reacted to the prices 
and shifted his behavior to become less valuable.  
 With respect to having a long-term planning horizon, policies (1) to (4) all use LCV 
maximization as the criterion when deciding which prices to charge, whereas the individual 
myopic dynamic policy considers only the short-term effect of pricing in each period. The 
myopic policy optimizes the prices to maximize only the current period profit, given the 
customer’s updated state-membership probabilities. 
 Table 9 summarizes the performances of the six price policies. The proposed policy yields 
the highest LCV per customer at $4,795 over nine months. By incorporating both individual and 
dynamic perspectives, there is a 73% gain in profitability compared to the aggregate static price 
policy. There is a 40% improvement due to individual targeted pricing ($3,855 vs. $2,759), and 
an 24% improvement due to accounting for dynamics ($4,795 vs. $3,855). The relative sizes are 
consistent with the existing literature in marketing, which highlights the importance of 
accounting for heterogeneity. Similarly, by having a long term perspective, the proposed policy 
improves the myopic policy by 17%.  
 Examining the seller’s current pricing policy during the nine-month holdout period suggests 
that the company is not doing too poorly – it beats the segment static policy, but falls slightly 





“good customers” and “bad customers”, and treats them differently, but does no update very well 
its belief of how customers transition between these two states.  Hence, the current policy does 
not properly account for the individual and the dynamic aspects of pricing. Compared to the 
current policy, the proposed policy offers a 52% improvement in profitability. On a base of 1,800 
customers, an average increase of $1,700 in profit over nine months can translate into a potential 
profit improvement of approximately $4 million annually. 
 To visualize the performance of each policy, we depict in Figure 4 the effect of 
implementing the proposed individual dynamic policy, the individual static policy, and the 
individual myopic policy, over the nine-month planning horizon. The plots show the average 
monthly profit per customer under each pricing policy. Alongside our policy simulations, we 
also track the profit under company’s current policy during this period. Several interesting 
patterns emerge. First, all individual-level policies (static, dynamic and myopic) start at a higher 
per-customer profit level than the current policy, highlighting the immediate reward of individual 
price targeting. Second, the proposed policy immediately jumps and achieves a higher projectile 
relative to the static policy, showing the impact of accounting for customer dynamics. Third, the 
proposed policy initially underperforms the myopic policy, as it carefully balances the interplay 
between several forces that govern customer buying behaviors, namely, 1) charging lower prices 
to increase bid-acceptance; 2) charging lower prices to keep customers in and toward the relaxed 
state, 3) charging higher prices to increase profit, and 4) charging higher prices to not decrease 
customers reference prices. The myopic policy, on the other hand, ignores points 2) and 4), and 
as shown in Table 9, charges lower prices than the proposed policy in order to convert the quote-
requests into immediate sales. However, doing so will drastically lower customers’ reference 
prices, make future prices more likely to be perceived by customers as losses, and subsequently 
increase the likelihood of customer migration to the vigilant state, which, as we have shown in 
Figure 1 and 2, could have long lasting negative effects. The lowered reference prices create 
more downward pressure for the seller when setting prices, establishing a vicious cycle of 
lowered prices and hence lowered profits. Within the first two to three months, the proposed 
policy begins to dramatically outperform the myopic policy, demonstrating the significance of 
keeping the long-term reference-price effects in mind when setting prices. This findings 
consistent with those of Montoya et al. (2010), who show that in the context of physician 





as the forward-looking policy needs to first invest in moving the physician base to higher buying 
states.  
 Furthermore, Figure 4 shows the decline in myopic policy profit crosses over the static 
policy around the fifth month, suggesting that in the long run, accounting for the long-term 
effects of pricing, even if the prices are set statically for each customer, is more impactful than 
dynamically yet myopically varying prices. In contrast with the findings of Montoya et al. 
(2010), who highlight the superior profit performance of a dynamic policy over a static policy 
even if such policy is myopic in nature, we show that in our pricing context, where reference-
price updating plays a crucial and a long-lasting role, one needs to first and foremost be aware of 
these reference-price effects and the long-term impact of pricing. We argue that a dynamic 
pricing policy is useful only if the seller keeps a long-term perspective. Myopia, in the world of 
B2B where pricing can affect both state transitions as well as reference-price updating, is very 
dangerous and can be a slippery slope, literally.  
    




































$3,158 $4,795 $3,855 $3,318 $2,759 $2,457 $4,105 
Mean Price 
($/lb) $3.24 $3.39 $3.27 $3.43 
$3.29  
($3.3; $2.9)* $3.40 $3.27 
Median Price 
($/lb) $2.87 $3.29 $3.10 $3.22 NA NA $3.10 
 
6.1. Comparison of Prices Charged Under Different Price Policies 
We compare the unit price per pound charged under each policy. The results are shown in Table 
9 and can be visualized in Figure 5. Compared to the company’s current pricing practice, both 
the myopic and the proposed policies recommend charging higher prices, with multi-modal 
distributions, to flexibly account for heterogeneity in price elasticities among customers. The 
myopic policy on average recommends lower prices than the proposed policy (mean prices of 
$3.39 vs. 3.27, and median prices of $3.29 vs. $3.10). These lower prices are the result of 
focusing only on gaining a customer’s business today, with no regard for how the lower prices 
will adversely impact this customer’s references prices going forward. 







6.2. How do We Value Vigilant and Relaxed Customers Differently? 
We have shown in Section 4 how customers behave differently with respect to the decision 
components in the B2B buying process, when they are in vigilant vs. relaxed buying states. We 
now synthesize the myriad of differences in behavioral parameter estimates, translate them into 
the contexts of LCV, and to examine  how much vigilant and relaxed customers differ in terms of 
their long-run profitability to the firm. To perform this comparison, we track, for the entire nine-
month holdout period under the proposed dynamic targeted pricing policy, each customer’s 
buying behavior and state-membership probability on each purchase occasion. Then, given the 
state that a customer is in, we assign his profit to that particular state. The distributions of the 
state-specific LCVs are shown in Figure 6. Each customer has an overall nine-month LCV of 
$4,795. Customers who are in the vigilant state have a LCV of $3,551 on average, whereas those 
who are in the relaxed state have an impressive LCV of $6,137, almost doubling the profit of 
their vigilant state counterparts. As Figure 6 illustrates, the stark contrast in profitability among 
the two states results in a bimodal pattern of the overall LCV distribution.  This analysis shows 





the seller, as portrayed in Section 4, these “favorable” behaviors can translate into substantial 
financial gains. 
 To see how state membership can directly impact profitability, we graph the monthly LCV 
with the percentage of customers in relaxed state on the same time-series plot in Figure 7. We 
see that as the relaxed state membership increases during the nine-months planning horizon, the 
profitability directly increases – first in almost lock-step during the initial two months, and then 
experiences a lagged increase from the third month onward. 
 The results monetize the phenomenon of the slow long-run behavioral adaption shown in 
Figure 1 and 2. When customers are transitioned into the relaxed state, the favorable buying 
behaviors become long lasting as the state-memberships are sticky, resulting in consistently 


















6.3  How Much to Charge, and to Whom? 
Figure 5 has shown that compared to the current pricing practice, price distribution under the 
proposed policy has a higher mean, is more diffuse, and has multiple local modes to 
accommodate customer heterogeneity. An examination of how much customers in each state are 
priced, shown in Figure 8, tells us that whereas the seller’s current policy does not vary prices 
between vigilant and relaxed customers, the proposed price policy recommends charging a much 
higher price for customers that are in the relaxed state vs. those that are in the vigilant state 
($3.65 vs. $3.22). The reasons for the current pricing’s lack of price differentiation could be a 
mixture of  1) the seller not properly accounting for customer heterogeneity, 2) the seller not 
properly assigning the correct state membership to each customer, and 3) the seller not properly 
tracking customer’s state transition dynamically and hence adjust its prices in a timely fashion. 





relaxed state, the seller should charge a higher price, as doing so will 1) increase immediate 
profit and 2) increase the customer’s reference price. Although a higher price might increase the 
probability of transition into the vigilant state, the stickiness of the state probability and the 
already increased reference prices as a “shield” against price losses empirically suggests that the 
benefits of a higher price outweigh the potential negative impact. On the other hand, when 
customers fall into the vigilant state, the seller should price very aggressively to achieve the 
following two goals. First, for the customers on the margin, the seller needs to try to get them out 
of the vigilant state, as this state has a drastically lower profit, and as shown in the adaptation 
plot in Figure 2, customers tend stay much longer in the vigilant state if there is no intervention. 
Due to customers’ loss aversion in the long-run, the positive gains in state transition probability 
towards the relaxed state outweigh the negative effect of lowered reference prices. Second, for 
those customers who are persistently in the vigilant state, who habitually order via quote requests 
and with little chance of transitioning back to the relaxed state, lowering prices (above the 
seller’s cost, of course) would at least increase the immediate probability of the quote requests 
getting successfully accepted, thus ensuring some profits from these “unprofitable customers”. In 
short, the overall pricing strategy for our seller would be – 1) milk your best customers with high 
prices; 2) turn your marginally vigilant customers into good customers by first lowering and 
subsequently increasing prices; and 3) charge low prices for your “worst” customers to salvage 
some profits from them.  
 In summary, the improved profit performance of our individual dynamic targeted price 
policy, relative to the current policy can be attributed to 1) understanding each customer’s 
inherent price elasticities and setting prices to fully account for heterogeneity, 2) accurately 
identifying and tracking customers’ buying states and dynamically changing the prices 
accordingly, charging higher prices for those customers in the relaxed state, and 3) a long-run 
perspective to ensure the optimal tradeoff between the short and long run impacts of pricing on 
immediate profit, delayed profit, reference-prices effects, and customer buying state migrations. 











6.4  Pricing in a Volatile Economic Environment - the Role of External Reference Price 
  
In this section we examine the price strategies that the seller should use to manage volatile 
economic conditions. Specifically, we look at how fluctuations in the raw aluminum prices 
would impact the seller and its customers.  
For the duration of our dataset, the aluminum prices on LME have fluctuated between 
US$2,393 to US$3,318 per tonne. Initially stable for the first half of 2007, the price of aluminum 
experienced a sharp drop starting in August of 2007 when the world felt the seriousness of the 
sub-prime meltdown, followed by a rapid increase starting in January of 2008, reaching the peak 
in July, and then eventually declined for the periods leading up to the Great Recession. Although 
the price of aluminum is perhaps the most important factor for our seller as it directly influences 
the wholesale price, the impact of LME fluctuation on seller’s profitability is not readily obvious. 
To illustrate, rising raw material prices could increase the seller’s costs, providing downward 





attractive in reference to the high material price, and the seller might be able to pass the 
increased costs onto customers. On the other hand, a drop in material prices might lower the 
seller’s cost, but at the same time customers might wish to pay lower prices in light of the 
cheaper commodity. 
To provide an empirical answer to the question “how should the seller price in the 
presence of a volatile economic environment?”, we use the proposed individual dynamic price 
policy to perform price simulations in the presence of a 20% increase and a 20% decrease in 
LME, and compare the resulting prices and profits to those of the original LME level.13 In 
general, a 20% change in LME translates to approximately 10% change in seller’s cost. 
 Figure 9 shows the distribution of the optimal prices under each LME regime. For a 20% 
increase in the LME, the mean optimal price is $3.70 – a 9% price increase relative to the 
optimal price under the original LME levels ($3.39). However, when the LME drops by 20%, the 
optimal policy suggests a mean price of $3.30, which is a meager 2.7% price reduction. Figure 
10 shows additional implications for the customers in the relaxed and vigilant states. We see that 
when the LME price increases by 20%, it is optimal for the firm to pass through this increase in 
replacement cost by increasing the unit prices for customers in the vigilant state by 12%. In 
comparison, a modest increase of 4.6% is optimal for customers in the relaxed state. This makes 
sense as vigilant customers are more sensitive to changes in the LME prices, relative to relaxed 
customers (see Table 4). Figure 10 also shows that when LME prices drop by 20%, it is optimal 
for the firm to “hoard” most of the cost saving and drop prices by only 2.5%-2.8% for customers 
in both states. The rationale here is that lowering the price results in corresponding lowering of 







Figure 9: Price Distributions at Different LME Levels 
                                                 
13 Our use of a 20% shock in LME falls within the range of fluctuations experienced in this business. The maximum 

















So what governs this asymmetry in pricing? There are two opposing mechanisms at work 
– buyers’ internal vs. external reference prices. First, when LME increases, as shown in Table 4, 
customers respond by  treating it as a higher external reference price, and reacts more 
enthusiastically to firm’s current prices in the forms of larger quantity, higher direct order and 
bid acceptance probability. This behavior is more prevalent amongst vigilant customers, who pay 
more attention to the external reference prices. The usage of LME as an external reference price 
grants the seller the license to increase prices to offset the rising cost, but only by so much, as too 
high of a price increase would be punished by customer’s focus on internal reference price, 
which would represent the price increase as a “loss”. However, when the LME drops, although 
the seller is now “penalized” by exposing customers to a lower external reference price, it has no 
strong incentive to lower prices because doing so will lower customer’s internal reference prices, 
which appears to have a much more drastic impact than the external reference price effect.  
This price strategy of passing on the cost increase, and “hoarding” the benefit of cost 
decrease is consistent with the economic research on price fairness (Akerloff 1979, Kahneman et 
al. 1986, Okun 1981, Urbany et al. 1989). In their seminal work, Kahneman et al (1986) 





market place. The dual entitlement principle states that 1) customers use reference cues when 
making transactions; 2) firms are “justified”, in the eyes of customers, to increase prices when 
costs increase, in order to protect firms’ normal profits; and 3) firms do not need to lower prices 
when costs drop, because customers would be glad to pay their past reference prices. In our 
framework, price fairness is captured by the external, internal reference prices, and loss aversion 
– when costs increase, the seller is justified to increase prices to a certain degree, when costs 
decrease, the potential of the lowered reference prices and the subsequent “price losses”, 
amplified by loss aversion, suggest that it is best to keep prices the same. 
How does this pricing strategy translate into long-term profitability? Figure 11 shows the 
LCV under each LME regime and broken down by each state. We find that when the LME 
increases the firm is “entitled” to keep the normal profits it had prior to the price increase (the 
LCV drops only slightly from $4795 to $4701). However, the optimal price response to a drop in 
LME prices increases the LCV substantially, from $4795 to $5103. This is an increase of about 
7% increase resulting from proportional increases within both states.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically test the dual-
entitlement principle, and to measure the extent of it in a B2B transaction setting. Therefore, to 
profitably manage the fluctuation in economic conditions, sellers should pass on the cost 
increases, especially for vigilant customers. To justify price increases, sellers should effectively 
communicate the reason for the price increases to customers, and make them aware of the high 
external reference on LME. On the other hand, cost decreases present a good opportunity for 















7. General Discussion 
Understanding and managing the impact of pricing on customer buying behavior is critical for 
B2B firm profitability in the long-run. Dynamic and targeted pricing at the individual level 
provide firms with great flexibility in extracting additional profits from their customers. To do so 
successfully, and to ensure long-term profitability from each customer, the firm needs to 1) 
effectively leverage individual-level information and consider heterogeneity in customers’ 
responses, 2) understand and appropriately capture the industrial buyer buying process and the 
interdependencies therein, 3) understand customer’s sensitivities to prices and the asymmetric 
reference price effects, 4) measure the dynamics in customer’s buying behavior, 5) understand 
both the short-term and long-term impact of the pricing policy, and 6) operate in a business 
environment where individually and inter-temporally targeted pricing are feasible. 
In this paper, we present such an integrative framework to capture the individual-level 
and long-term impact of pricing decisions in B2B settings. We identify several insights by 





uncover two latent and theoretically interesting buying behavior states which characterize the 
buyer-sellers relationships. Second, we find that pricing in B2B significantly influences customer 
decisions not only in the short-run but also in the long-term. Thus, B2B pricing models that do 
not account for the long-term impact of pricing, may severely underestimate the impact of 
pricing. Third, despite the view that B2B customers are rational, we find significant asymmetric 
reference effects in industrial customer responses to prices. Fourth, the impact of a price hike is 
stronger than the impact of a price drop, and takes much longer for customers to adapt to, 
particularly for quote request behaviors, bid acceptance, and vigilante state membership - factors 
that are more closely related to customers’ relationship with the sellers. Therefore, firms should 
be cautious of the possibly long-term negative impact of charging a customer a higher price on 
any particular order.   
Through a series of price policy simulations and customer life-time value analyses, we 
demonstrate that the proposed dynamic targeted price policy can offer a 56% improvement in 
profitability over the current policy. We decompose the effects of individual pricing, dynamic 
pricing and pricing with a long-term perspective, and show that in the presence of reference-
price effects, a dynamic pricing policy itself is not sufficient in improving profit, if it does not 
properly account for the long-term effect of pricing on future reference-price updating. 
Furthermore, we show that relaxed customers on average are worth twice as much as vigilant 
customers, and that the optimal price policy is a “Milk, Transition, and Salvage” strategy. 
When implementing our proposed dynamic targeted pricing strategy in a volatile 
economic environment with cost fluctuations, we generally recommend the seller to pass on the 
increased costs to customers but keep the prices the same when costs decrease. This active 
management will help the seller maintain existing level of profitability during inflationary 
periods, and enjoy increased profitability during deflationary periods. These empirical results are 
consistent with the dual-entitlement principle. 
Methodologically, we jointly model the multiple interrelated decisions via copulas, 
capture the dynamics in the interrelated buying decisions and the long-term effect of pricing 
decisions via a non-homogeneous HMM, and fully account for potential price endogeneity in a 
Bayesian control function framework. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to 
incorporate copulas in a HMM, and the first paper to flexibly incorporate price endogeneity in 





with a comprehensive modeling framework to manage their customer base through an effective 
and profitable dynamic targeted pricing policy. As many B2B firms are still applying cost-based 
pricing strategies (Anderson et al. 1993), we demonstrate that there is substantial value in 
instituting a value-based pricing policy, taking advantage of the flexibility offered by the ability 
to implement first-degree inter-temporal price discrimination.  
We highlight several limitations and directions for future research. First, we assume that 
customers are not forward looking with respect to the firm’s pricing decisions. One could extend 
our framework to incorporate customer’s expectation about the price changes (Lewis 2005). 
Second, similar to typical B2C and B2B CRM datasets, our data include no information about 
competitive pricing. Obtaining such information one could extend our framework to a 
competitive setting. Alternatively, one could augment the competitive pricing effect using an 
approach similar to that by Moon et al. (2007). Third, while we focus in this research on B2B 
pricing decisions, our methodological framework is appropriate for many B2C settings in which 
the customer buying process is composed of several interrelated decisions, and the firm has the 
opportunity to price discriminate and varying degrees.  Finally, although this is the first paper to 
demonstrate empirically the dynamic persistence of reference-price effects, future research could 
examine the dynamic patterns of reference-price effects in other industries, and to consider 
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Appendix A. Priors and Full Conditionals Distributions for 
Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation 
 
We denote by 1{ , }
S
i is is sθ β γ ==  the set of random-effect parameters and by ( )0 01 1, , ,{ } ,{ }S Sqt bw s s s sφ θ θ σ α β= ==  the set of fixed-effect (including state-specific and non state-




Random-effect parameters iθ  :   ' 11~ ( , ) ( ) exp ( ( ) ( )2i i i iN Pθ θ θ θ θθ μ θ θ μ θ μ
−⎛ ⎞Σ => ∝ − Σ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
    ' 10 0 0 0 0
1~ ( , V ) ( ) exp ( ( ) V ( )
2
N Pθ θ θ θμ μ μ μ μ μ μ−⎛ ⎞=> ∝ − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
    0 0 0~ ( , )IW df df SθΣ  
    Fixed-effect parameters φ :     ' 11~ ( , ) ( ) exp ( ( ) ( )
2
N Pφ φ φ φ φφ μ φ φ μ φ μ−⎛ ⎞Σ => ∝ − Σ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 Likelihood:        { } { } { }(data, , , , ) (data| , ) ( | , ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i iL P P P P Pθ θ θ θ θ θθ φ μ θ φ θ μ φ μΣ = Σ Σ  
     Full conditionals:      ' 11( | , , ,data ) exp ( ( ) ( ) (data | , )
2i i i i i i
P Pθ θ θ θ θθ μ φ θ μ θ μ θ φ−⎛ ⎞Σ ∝ − Σ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
                                       { } { }' 11( | , , ,data) exp ( ( ) ( ) (data | , )
2i i
P Pφ φ φ φ φφ μ θ φ μ φ μ θ φ−⎛ ⎞Σ ∝ − Σ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
      ~ ( ,V )n nNθμ μ  
      1 1 1~ ( , )IW df df SθΣ  
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N is the number of individuals, { }(data| , )iP θ φ  and (data | , )i iP θ φ  are given by Equation (31), 
and quantity, inter-purchase-event time, quote request,  bid acceptance and price-generating 









 The MCMC procedure generates a sequence of draws from the posterior distribution of 
the model’s parameters. Because the full conditionals for iθ  and φ  do not have closed forms, the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to draw the samples. In particular, we use a Gaussian 
random-walk Metropolis-Hastings where a proposal vector of parameters ( )tϕ  for iθ  or φ , at 
iteration t is drawn from the Gaussian proposal distribution ( 1) 2( ,tN ϕϕ σ− Δ)  and accepted using 
the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance ratio. The tuning constant 2ϕσ  and Δ  are updated using the 
method proposed by Atchade (2006) to yield an acceptance rate of approximately 25%. 
We use the following uninformative prior hyper-parameters for the two-state HMM: 
 
For random effect parameters: 
0 0μ ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ , 0V 100In nθ θ×= , 0 5df nθ= + , 0 In nS θ θ×= , where nθ  is the number of parameters in θ  
for each individual, and In nθ θ×  is an identity matrix of rank nθ . 
 
For fixed-effect parameters: 
[0.3,0.3,0.5,0.5,0.5, ]φμ η= , where η  is a 1x13 vector of zeros. 
φΣ  is a diagonal matrix of rank nφ , with the first 5 diagonal elements set to 2, and the next 13 
diagonal elements set to 100. 
 
Because some parameters are transformed to an exponential scale, we accordingly chose prior 
hyper-parameters for θμ , θΣ , and φμ  such that their prior means and prior variances are diffuse 





Appendix B – Price Simulation Procedure 
We initialize the simulation by calculating for each customer the state membership probability 
and the reference price at end of the calibration period. The simulation procedure continues as 
follows:  
1. Draw for each customer for the first purchase event four independent uniform variates 
( 1u , 2v , 3u , 4v ). We use the same random draws for all price points at the purchase event. 























Where qtθ denotes the Frank copula correlation parameter that governs the 
interdependence structure between quantity and inter-purchase event time. 
3. Generate state specific quantity c such that 
1
1( )sij qq F u
−=  with mean qij six β  and parameter 
σ . 14 
4. Update the quantity weighted reference price.  
5. Conditioned on sijq , generate sijt  such 
1
2( )sij tt F u
−=  with mean qij six β  and parameter sα . 
6. Convert 4v  to 4u  using the Frank copula as in point 2 above using the copula parameter 
bwθ . 
7. Calculate the latent utility for quote request 
*







⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  







⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  
The observed decisions sijb and sijw  are governed by the underlying latent utilities as 
described in section 4.3.2.  
9. Given the 4 state specific behaviors, calculate state-conditional profits. The purchase 
event unconditional profit is calculated as the weighted-average of the state-conditional 
profits, weighted by state-membership probability for purchase event j. 
10. Update the state membership for each customer as described by Equation (18). 
11. For each price point in the current purchase event, repeat steps 1-10 to generate the 
profits in the next purchase event for each new possible price point,  
12. Repeat step 11 until the cumulative inter-purchase event time reaches the planning 
horizon (9 months). The step would result in 5 iJ  possible price paths for the customer, 
where 5 is the number of price points, and Ji is the number of purchase event for 
customer i in the planning horizon.   
13. Repeat step 1-12, 200 times to generate 200 profit functions for each possible price paths 
for each customer.  
14. Calculate the average LCV of each price path across the 200 draws. Choose the price 
path with the highest average LCV as the optimal price path for that customer.   
15. Repeat steps 1-14 for each customer.  
For the purpose of profit calculations we make several assumptions based on discussion with the 
seller’s management: (1) we use a discount rate of 12% (a weekly discount rate r of 0.22%); (2) 
for cost we use actual average wholesale price recorded by the seller for each date in the 
planning horizon; (3) we add a $50 fixed cost to each order to capture shipping and 
                                                 
14 As quantity is used to determine inter-purchase event time and reference price going forward, to avoid bad draws 
of quantity that will make a purchase path explode into unreasonable regions and create computational issues, we 
resample sijq for a customer if the current draw is less than half of the minimum quantity, or more than double of the 





administrative costs (4) we use the actual LME commodity prices in each day in the planning 
horizon.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
